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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the history and experience of social enterprise within Atlantic Canada. As part of the 
International Comparative Social Enterprise Models (ICSEM) research project, this article aims to describe the 
unique historical, contextual, and conceptual approaches to social enterprise in Atlantic Canada. Four case 
studies are provided to illustrate the diversity of social enterprise in the region. The article argues that the 
historical roots of social enterprise in Atlantic Canada can be found within the Antigonish Movement, and that 
the founding political economic vision of that movement can inform a progressive and transformative approach 
to social enterprise in the region. 
 
RÉSUMÉ 
Cet article explore l’histoire et la pratique de l’entreprise sociale dans les provinces de l’Atlantique. Écrit dans le 
cadre du projet ICSEM (« International Comparative Social Enterprise Models »), cet article a pour but de 
décrire les approches historiques, contextuelles et conceptuelles envers les entreprises sociales propres aux 
provinces de l’Atlantique. Il présente quatre études de cas afin d’illustrer la diversité des entreprises sociales de 
la région. L’article soutient que les racines historiques de l’entreprise sociale dans les provinces de l’Atlantique 
remontent jusqu’au Mouvement d’Antigonish, et que la vision politico-économique fondatrice de ce Mouvement 
pourrait sous-tendre une approche envers les entreprises sociales de la région qui soit progressiste et 
transformatrice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is to review the experience of social enterprise in the Atlantic Provinces. The article 
finds that there is not yet a strong conceptual attachment to social enterprise in Atlantic Canada. There are, 
however, a variety of approaches to social enterprise that we can observe in the region. The article will first look 
at the historical, contextual, and conceptual understanding and rooting of social enterprise in Atlantic Canada. 
Second, the article examines four illustrative cases—one from each Atlantic province—that demonstrate the 
diversity of social enterprise in Atlantic Canada. Third, I review the institutional supports (legislation, policy, and 
associations) for social enterprise in Atlantic Canada. Finally, I provide some comments on the present state of 
social enterprise in the region. 
 
 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
For at least the last half century, Atlantic Canada has faced serious and persistent economic and social 
challenges. Donald Savoie (2006) argues that the Maritimes have been an underperforming region in Canada 
going back to confederation. Social enterprises often emerge in such geographies—where the market and the 
state have failed to provide adequate responses to social, economic, and environmental challenges (Amin, 
Cameron, & Hudson, 2002; Hudson, 2011). It, therefore, should not be surprising that the history of social 
enterprise, which is broadly defined as a business operating for a social purpose, in Atlantic Canada is quite rich. 
 
An organized economic movement around social enterprise in Atlantic Canada started in the 1920s with the 
Antigonish Movement (Dodaro & Pluta, 2012). The Atlantic Provinces, at that time, had seen a reversal in their 
fortunes. Whereas in the nineteenth century, especially pre-confederation, the Maritime Provinces had been 
some of the most developed of the colonies, the twentieth century brought on decline. Important financial 
institutions moved offices to Ontario or Québec; other important industrial sectors were subject to the desires of 
absentee owners; labour unrest was common; and traditional maritime industries (shipbuilding, forestry, 
shipping trade) were rapidly declining. The economic hardships felt by the region fomented distrust and anger 
toward industrial capitalism and opened up the possibility for an alternative socioeconomic system. The 
Antigonish Movement was able to address this desire for a different approach. 
 
Led by Moses Coady and Jimmy Tompkins, the Antigonish Movement established numerous cooperatives and 
credit unions across Atlantic Canada (and further afield). Based on ideas borrowed from Robert Owen and other 
utopian socialists as well as Catholic social thought, the Antigonish Movement advocated for cooperatives as 
the outcome of an adult learning process. Critically, Coady and Tompkins argued that people had the potential, 
and the responsibility, to take control of the economic resources of the region; they had the power to become, in 
Coady’s (1939) words, “masters of their own destiny.” 
 
Coady and Tompkins employed an integrated program of development. The first step was educational; it 
involved the rollout of informational sources via pamphlets, bulletins, and circulating libraries, as well as 
leadership training. The cornerstones of the educational process were mass public meetings. The mass public 
meetings would then lead to the creation of smaller study clubs. The study clubs would then organize to create 
cooperative economic institutions (Dodaro & Pluta, 2012). 
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The Antigonish Movement went through a rapid expansion in the 1930s radiating out from its home in Eastern 
Nova Scotia to all of the Atlantic Provinces and beyond. Attendance at mass meetings went from 14,856 people 
at 192 meetings in 1931, to 43,000 people at 470 meetings by 1936. Those meetings resulted in 173 study 
clubs being established in 1931 going up to 1,300 active study clubs by 1939. By the end of the 1930s the 
Antigonish Movement contributed to the creation of over 240 cooperative enterprises across Atlantic Canada. 
Cooperatives spanned several sectors, including fisheries, agriculture, finance (credit unions), housing, and 
retail (cooperative stores). 
 
Success and momentum brought international recognition but also high expectations. The movement needed to 
deal with its success and expansion before it had a chance to put down roots (Dodaro & Pluta, 2012). Although 
it thrived for a few decades, by the 1960s the movement was declining. Cooperative development stagnated 
and the second generation of leadership pragmatically focused on operational issues and, arguably, lost sight of 
the transformative vision of the movement. The radical vision of community control over the economy to bring 
“the full and abundant life to all” (Johnson, 1944, p. 9) was lost. 
 
There are, however, many communities where the legacy of the movement lives on. Regions such as the 
Acadian communities of Cheticamp in Nova Scotia and the Evangeline Region of Prince Edward Island (see 
case study below) have maintained a thriving cooperative community and the cooperative sector remains 
relatively strong across the Atlantic Provinces. 
 
Though the regional problem in Atlantic Canada continued in the postwar boom years, the issue became more 
acute again in the 1970s as the industries that sustained the economy, such as mining, steel, and pulp and 
paper, began to close down. At the same time governments (both federal and provincial) began to roll back the 
welfare state with cuts to social programs coming alongside efforts of deregulation and privatization. Numerous 
nonprofits were created in order to take care of those marginalized individuals who now found themselves 
without state support. Many of these organizations that ran on a redistributionist model began to adopt 
enterprising forms and behaviours in the latter part of the century as a means to secure more diverse and stable 
funding. 
 
At the same time, a small number of community business corporations emerged across the Atlantic Provinces 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Building on the legacy of the Antigonish Movement, leaders such as Greg 
MacLeod sought ways of creating community-controlled enterprises but were not as attached to the cooperative 
form (MacLeod, 1986). Community corporations such as New Dawn Enterprises in Cape Breton (see case 
below) and the Great Northern Peninsula Development Corporation (GNPDC) in Newfoundland were 
established to create economic activity for the purpose of community development. These three models (co-
ops, nonprofits, and community businesses) constitute the main social enterprise forms currently operating in 
Atlantic Canada. 
 
More recently, a new form of “social” enterprise has emerged in Atlantic Canada. A spate of enterprises formed 
for the purpose of reviving local economies have appeared. However, rather than being endogenously driven, 
community organized and owned, they are characterized by wealthy benefactors and investors, sometimes 
expatriate community members, pursuing a private vision of community development. Some, such as Zita 
Cobb’s Shorefast on Fogo Island, NL, use social enterprise organizational forms to achieve social and cultural 
goals (Shorefast Foundation, n.d.). Others, such as Glynn Williams’s Authentic Seacoast in Guysborough, NS, 
employ traditional privately held business models (Bruce, 2012; Taber, 2013). 
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It is notable that the history of social enterprise activity in Atlantic Canada has often been against the grain of 
national and provincial policy. Policy approaches to regional problems have historically been top down, focusing 
on industrial sectors and employing a growth-pole, trickle-down model. Depleted communities outside of urban 
centres were largely left on their own. By the 1990s, however, the language of community economic 
development (CED) had penetrated provincial and federal governments. At the government level, CED was 
read to equate with endogenous, bottom-up approaches to economic development. Conceptual linkages to 
issues of social justice and alternative economic forms, however, were absent. Policies that followed tended to 
focus on entrepreneurship and innovation rather than social enterprise. This approach to CED fit well with the 
neoliberal policies of the time, which saw CED as an opportunity to download responsibility for development to 
communities themselves. 
 
Within Atlantic Canada, Nova Scotia has been notable for pioneering a number of important tools and policies 
supportive of social enterprise. There are four particular policies that should be noted in this regard. First, the 
Community Economic Development Investment Fund (CEDIF) was established in 1999 to provide incentives for 
investors to place their money with local firms that qualify with the policy. While not specifically targeted toward 
social enterprise, many organizations have made use of this important financing mechanism. The CEDIF policy 
has been replicated in PEI (2012) and New Brunswick has similar legislation in process. Second, the CEDIF 
program was extended to fit into Nova Scotia’s Community Feed-In Tariff (COMFIT) program; encouraging 
CEDIFs to operate in the renewable energy field. Third, in 2012, Nova Scotia created legislation for a 
community interest company (CIC) form, allowing for the creation of companies with explicit community benefit 
purposes (Service Nova Scotia, 2012). Finally, Nova Scotia is in the process of introducing social impact bonds, 
although they are sometimes controversial (Joy & Shields, 2013). 
 
CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW 
The context of social enterprise in Atlantic Canada is characterized by economic and geographic isolation and 
historical legacies of alternative economic movements. The Atlantic Provinces have long been “have-not” 
provinces. Even Newfoundland and Labrador’s recent elevation to “have” status, boosted by oil and gas 
developments, has not been felt by all residents. Newfoundland and Labrador still has one of Canada’s highest 
unemployment rates and many residents seek work off island. The Atlantic region has experienced over a half 
century of chronically high unemployment levels due to prolonged industrial decline and federal politics that 
favoured central and western regions. Communities that have suffered the loss of traditional industries focus 
their efforts on saving the community. In this context, social enterprises are often viewed as mechanisms for 
reinvigorating local place-based economies. Economic salvation is connected to concerns for the survival of 
social and cultural identities linked to place. Further, the historical legacy of the Antigonish Movement informs 
the current practice of social enterprise. Community control of economic resources remains a central tenet of 
many Atlantic social enterprises.  
 
CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW 
Atlantic provincial governments have not, despite some historical success, significantly acknowledged social 
enterprise. Nova Scotia established a Social Enterprise Working Group that produced a discussion paper on 
social enterprise in Nova Scotia (Nova Scotia Social Enterprise Working Group, 2011). They define social 
enterprise as “businesses or organizations operated for the purpose of tackling social, economic or 
environmental challenges” (p. 5). They also include five attributes of social enterprise to develop their definition: 
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1) democratic governance and a social mission, 2) profits are reinvested to advance the mission, 3) foster social 
and economic purposes, employ disadvantaged people, 4) blended (social and financial) return on investment, 
and 5) support social and economic integration for people confronting challenges. The Nova Scotia definition 
broadly shares elements of the EMES research network’s definition (social mission, economic project, 
participatory governance) (Defourny & Nyssens, 2012), though it tends to weigh more heavily on provision of 
social services (via integrating marginalized individuals). Within Nova Scotia policy, the community interest 
company (CIC) framework adopts a mission-driven business approach. Community interest companies are 
defined as “businesses whose primary purpose is the common good” (Service Nova Scotia, 2012). 
 
In the New Brunswick context, a similar advisory group, the Advisory Committee on Social Enterprise and 
Community Investment Funds (SECIF), was struck in 2011 to examine social enterprise. SECIF was set in the 
context of a larger poverty reduction plan entitled Overcoming Poverty Together, which took a systematic 
approach to poverty. SECIF was one of three committees established to support the overall plan. They too 
produced a policy paper outlining the development of a social enterprise framework. SECIF describes social 
enterprise as a “form of business which occupies the space on the spectrum of economic activity between the 
non-profit sector and the for-profit sector” (Economic and Social Inclusion Corporation, 2012). The document 
sets out four criteria for social enterprise: 1) selling goods or services in the marketplace; 2) its primary purpose 
is to create social, environmental, and/or cultural value; 3) it uses a minimum of 51 percent of any profits to 
enhance programs and/or services to improve communities; and 4) it demonstrates evidence of the above. 
 
Various institutional actors in Atlantic Canada have also defined the concept of social enterprise. The Atlantic 
Canada Council for Community and Social Enterprise (ACCSE) is an advocacy group (organized as a not-for-
profit cooperative) established in 2011. ACCSE defines community and social enterprise as “organizations … 
that operate like a business, produce goods and services for the market, but manage operations and direct 
surpluses in pursuit of social, environmental and cultural goals” (ACCSE, 2014). The nod toward some 
constraints on surplus distribution in ACCSE’s definition also hints at the EMES’ institutional approach to social 
enterprise. The Pond-Deshpande Centre at the University of New Brunswick defines social enterprise as “a 
business or organization, whether not-for-profit or for-profit, which has a strategic mission/purpose to address 
community, social, environmental challenges, issues and needs in the interest of the common good” (Pond-
Deshpande Centre, 2015). 
 
Interest in social enterprise has stimulated private sector responses as well. Common Good Solutions, in Nova 
Scotia, is a consulting firm that specializes in social enterprise development. They have partnered with other 
organizations such as Enterprising Non-Profits NS, an affiliate of Enterprising Non-Profits Canada (see Elson, Hall, 
Leeson-Klym, Penner, & Andreas, in this issue). Common Good defines social enterprise as ventures that use 
revenue generating businesses to make positive change in their communities (Common Good Solutions, 2015). 
 
Other than these examples of a broader perspective, social enterprise in Atlantic Canada operates as a set of 
independent sectors (cooperatives, nonprofits, etc.). While the cooperative sector tends to be fairly coordinated 
in each province with provincial cooperative associations advocating for the sector (and organizations 
specifically serving the Anglophone and Acadian groups in New Brunswick, PEI, and Nova Scotia), the nonprofit 
sector tends to be more loosely organized (often around common services). Newfoundland and Labrador and 
Nova Scotia, however, have provincial organizations that represent the sector (Nova Scotia’s being quite 
recently organized). 
 
Lionais (2015) 
 
  
 
 
30 To be notified about new ANSERJ articles, subscribe here . / Afin d'être avisé des nouveaux articles 
dans ANSERJ, s’inscrire ici . 
 
As an emerging phenomenon in Atlantic Canada, social enterprises are defined (both in practice and 
conceptually) in a variety of ways. The legacy of the Antigonish Movement still resonates within some social 
enterprise. The social purpose of social enterprises that draw on this lineage is often rooted in community 
economic development and includes elements of democratic governance. Other social enterprises that have 
emerged in response to the decline of the welfare state focus on integrating marginalized peoples into the 
economic mainstream. Finally, we see more mainstream forms of enterprise brand themselves (or be branded 
by others) as social enterprises due to their efforts at local economic revitalization despite private ownership and 
private appropriation of surpluses. In each case, the concept of social enterprise is layered over preexisting 
forms and concepts (cooperatives and community business, nonprofits, and mainstream enterprise 
respectively). As the concept begins to take hold and policies are formed around social enterprise, such as 
Nova Scotia’s CIC legislation, distinct new approaches may emerge. 
 
 
CASES OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE IN ATLANTIC CANADA 
Four case studies have been selected, one from each province, to demonstrate the practice of social enterprise 
in Atlantic Canada.  
 
Analytical framework 
The framework for these cases builds upon the EMES indicators for social enterprise and Canadian-specific 
typologies developed by Peter Elson and Peter Hall (2013). The EMES indicators include 1) an economic 
project (production involving paid work and undertaking risk), 2) a social purpose (limited surplus distribution 
and initiative organized by a group of people or third sector organizations), and 3) participatory governance 
(autonomy, stakeholder participation, and decision making not based on capital ownership) (Defourny & 
Nyssens, 2012). Elson and Hall (2013) employ a combined approach to social enterprise that takes into account 
both the legal/ownership structure and the social purpose of social enterprise.  
 
The analytical framework also employs a political economic perspective developed by Ash Amin, Angus Cameron, 
and Ray Hudson (Amin et al., 2002; Hudson, 2011) that evaluates social enterprise in terms of its political relationship 
to mainstream capitalism. There are three distinct types of social enterprise identified in this classification: 
 
1. Social enterprise as redistribution-welfare system. Supportive of a neoliberal approach, social 
enterprise redistributes wealth toward those marginalized by the mainstream. 
2. Social enterprise as economic alternative. Wealth-creating enterprise based upon an alternate 
set of values and principles. Can work with the market and does not challenge the status quo. 
3. Radical social enterprise. Disruptive enterprises that seek to radically transform the status quo 
and create a post-capitalist future. 
 
The case studies will be structured as follows: 
 
• A brief typology by legal structure, ownership, and social purpose; 
• An overview of the social enterprise’s activities and history; 
• Business model and independence; 
• Participatory governance; and 
• Political economic position. 
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Case: New Dawn Enterprises Limited  
Sydney, Nova Scotia 
 
Typology 
Legal structure: Corporation limited by guarantee 
Ownership: Non-shareholding corporation, social property 
Purpose: Community development 
 
History 
New Dawn (New Dawn Enterprises Limited, 2015) was established in 1976. It is the outcome of several years of 
experimentation with organizational forms in response to community needs. The social entrepreneur at the heart 
of this development was Greg MacLeod, a catholic priest, scholar, and social activist. Prior to forming New 
Dawn Enterprises, MacLeod established a series of precursor community organizations. The antecedent 
organization to New Dawn was the Cape Breton Association for Cooperative Development, a nonprofit 
organization that addressed a local housing shortage. As the association developed, it found itself coming up 
against nonprofit regulations (under the Nova Scotia Societies Act) that barred it from engaging in business 
activity. MacLeod saw the need to find a new form of organization and established New Dawn Enterprises as a 
community purpose business. 
 
New Dawn is incorporated as a corporation limited by guarantee (a non-shareholding corporation). As such it is a 
form of social property operated in trust of the community. In its articles of incorporation, New Dawn included a 
number of clauses that achieve an outcome similar to the form of a community interest company. For instance it 
includes clauses that create an asset lock, whereby the benefits of doing business accrue to the community as a 
whole and not to any individuals associated with the organization. The mission of the organization is to “engage 
the community to create and support the development of a culture of self-reliance” (New Dawn, 2015). It is 
operated in trust of its community. New Dawn’s structure prohibits any distribution of surplus to individuals. All 
surpluses are reinvested in the organization and build the capacity of the organization to meet its social purpose. 
 
New Dawn’s early activities focused mainly on housing and other real estate ventures. For instance, one of the 
early projects (which was later sold) was to establish a number of dental clinics in the community. In response to 
a critical lack of dentists, New Dawn built and furnished a number of dental clinics in order to attract new 
dentists to the area. The project was very successful in filling this need in the community. 
 
New Dawn continues to expand its real estate holdings with a mixture of residential and commercial real estate 
currently valued at approximately $12 million. In 2013, New Dawn purchased a former high school and convent 
that occupies most of a city block. This project, intended to house a mix of social, cultural, and innovative 
organizations and businesses, is New Dawn’s most ambitious to date. Other novel real estate projects include a 
partnered project that supports housing for persons suffering from mental illness (the SHIMI project) and a youth 
access centre for homeless and vulnerable young people (Access 808). 
 
In addition to real estate, New Dawn has an education division offering vocational training programs and a 
healthcare division that provides home-care services and operates a guest home. New Dawn also has a division 
focused on community education and engagement. This division employs community development approaches 
to building community capacity and resilience. The community education and engagement division currently has 
five main activities: a citizen speaker series; a “films for change” series, a people’s school, a support program 
for community leaders, and a collective impact community planning initiative. The education and engagement 
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division looks at the big picture and New Dawn’s role in the community, while the other divisions focus on 
business operations. 
 
New Dawn has also taken advantage of the Nova Scotia CEDIF program. Its CEDIF offerings, which have 
operated for about ten years, have been some of the most successful in the province. As a non-shareholding 
corporation, New Dawn had to establish a separate organization (now three separate organizations) to run the 
CEDIFs. Its first CEDIF—New Dawn Holdings (incorporated in 2003)—raised funds that were loaned to New 
Dawn Enterprises. The more recent CEDIFs—New Dawn Community Investment (2012) and New Dawn 
Innovation Fund (2013)—have been established as tools to invest in locally owned businesses rather than into 
New Dawn directly. Over the last 10 years New Dawn has raised close to $10 million in CEDIF investments and 
has paid close to $1 million in dividends to local investors. 
 
New Dawn operates on a budget of approximately $7 million dollars and employs over 175 people. 
 
Business model and financial independence 
New Dawn is primarily self-financed through the sales of its goods and services. While in some cases the 
government is a client (e.g., housing individuals for the department of community services), the organization 
does not receive any core funding from public or philanthropic giving.   
 
Participatory governance 
A volunteer board of directors governs New Dawn. The directors operate on a one-vote-per-person system and 
are elected from the membership. The membership, however, is limited, with only a few members who are not 
directors (past directors often remain as members). In practice, the board nominates and elects new board 
members from the community. There are no dedicated seats on the board for clients of the various services of 
New Dawn. Given this governance structure, New Dawn falls short of the participatory governance dimension of 
the EMES framework in that stakeholders are not involved in the decision-making.  
 
Political economic position 
New Dawn fits into the alternative wealth creation approach to the social economy. Although we can witness 
examples of the redistributionist approach and (to a lesser extent) the radical approach, New Dawn mainly 
operates as an enterprise operating for the social good but generally accepting the mainstream economy. 
 
 
Case: Saint John Community Loan Fund 
Saint John, New Brunswick 
 
Typology 
Legal structure: Nonprofit corporation with charitable status 
Ownership: Community 
Purpose: Poverty reduction and labour market re-insertion 
 
History 
The Saint John Community Loan Fund (SJCLF) (Saint John Community Loan Fund, 2015) was established in 
1999 in response to high levels of poverty in Saint John. The Urban Core Network proposed the idea for the 
fund: a nonprofit organization focused on poverty reduction. Community credit was a seen as a mechanism that 
could help people living in poverty start their own businesses or re-engage with the labour market. The SJCLF 
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mission is “to improve social conditions, promote economic independence, and foster entrepreneurship in our 
community” (Canadian CED Network, 2005). 
 
Loans are made to individuals for business start up, employment, or shelter (e.g., rental down payments). The 
organization also provides literacy training and leadership training. The capital pool for loans comes in from 
community investors and donations (as a means to mitigate risk against losses). Over the last 15 years, the loan 
fund has made approximately 230 loans totalling over $369,000. The average loan size is quite small, at just 
over $1,600 per loan. The SJCLF claims this has saved the provincial government over $500,000 in social 
assistance payments. As a nonprofit, the SJCLF operates for the public benefit. It has accumulated an equity 
balance of $165,345 as of 2013. SJCLF operates on a yearly budget of approximately $412,000 dollars (2013). 
 
In addition to loans, the SJCLF offers several training programs in developing life skills and financial literacy. 
Other programs support enterprise development for particular groups (e.g., women and youth). SJCLF 
programming focuses on community resource mobilization and community ownership. Based on a community 
economic development model, the SJCLF has increasingly become interested in social enterprise as a 
mechanism for achieving its mission. 
 
Most recently the SJCLF has begun work on a social enterprise hub that would “foster creativity and 
entrepreneurship for poverty reduction” (SJCLF, 2015). The hub is intended to combine space for operating 
social enterprises (a café), incubator space for nascent social enterprises, and training space and offices for 
like-minded nonprofits. Through its social enterprise hub, the SJCLF is attempting to stimulate more social 
enterprise activity in its community.  
 
Business model and financial independence 
The SJCLF is financed through a variety of revenue streams. The largest source of revenues continues to be 
government sources, accounting for 45 percent of revenues. This includes contracts for services agreements as 
well as grants. The remainder is made up of various foundational contributions (philanthropic grants). The 
margin on loans distributed is not significant, as the interest charged does little more than cover the interest rate 
paid to investors.  
 
Participatory governance 
A volunteer board of directors governs the SJCLF. 
 
Political economic position 
The SJCLF fits into the redistributionist category. The purpose of the SJCLF is to help marginalized individuals 
find their way back into mainstream economic systems through business and employment loans. It is notable, 
that the SJCLF is now supporting social enterprise and therefore may represent a movement toward more 
alternative economic approaches. 
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Case: Evangeline Cooperatives 
Wellington, Prince Edward Island 
 
Typology 
Legal structure: Cooperative 
Ownership: Second-tier cooperative 
Purpose: Cooperative development 
 
History 
The Evangeline Region of Prince Edward Island is comprised of the French-speaking Acadian communities 
Wellington and Abrams Village and their surrounding areas between Bedeque Bay and Egmont Bay, west of 
Summerside. The current population is approximately 2,500 people (Statistics Canada 2012a, 2012b). 
Cooperative development in Evangeline began as far back as the 1860s but really took off in the 1930s with the 
influence of the Antigonish Movement. Through this movement, the Acadians of Evangeline created a number 
of credit unions, a fisherman’s cooperative, a farmers’ cooperative, as well as two consumer cooperatives. In 
1977 the cooperatives of the region united to form the Conseil de la coopération de l’Île-du-Prince-Édouard. The 
Conseil was a second-tier cooperative that grouped the region’s cooperatives into one functional body. The 
purposes of the Conseil were to promote cooperative education and development in Francophone PEI, to liaise 
with other Francophone cooperatives, and to control and coordinate the decision-making in cooperative 
concerns for Francophone PEI. 
 
In 1999, the Conseil re-organized itself as the Conseil de développement coopératif de l’Île-du-Prince-Édouard 
(CDC) (Conseil de développement coopératif, 2015) in order to take on a fully provincial mandate, although the 
majority of the cooperatives involved were still Evangeline based. Since 2010, the CDC has partnered with the 
Francophone economic development agency in PEI, RDÉE Île-du-Prince-Édouard, which is also based in the 
Evangeline region. The agreement means that the RDÉE is now in charge of the financial, material, and human 
resource management of the CDC. The CDC includes 17 member cooperatives representing 8,500 members. 
 
The Evangeline region is known as the world cooperative capital (Wilkinson & Quarter, 1996), with the highest per 
capita cooperative memberships. In 1996 it was reported that there were 2.5 cooperative memberships per 
inhabitant (Wilkinson & Quarter, 1996). Due to the 1999 reorganization of the CDC, it is more difficult to accurately 
calculate the per capita memberships, but the CDC reports that its member cooperatives have over 8,500 
memberships, the vast majority of whom live in the Evangeline region (Conseil de développement coopératif, 2015). 
 
The success of the cooperative movement in the Evangeline region has led to “cooperative burnout” in the past, 
whereby the numerous cooperatives were finding it difficult to keep people on their boards and committees due 
to competing demands. Partly to deal with this, and partly because of losing their main funding source, the 
Conseil looked into a number of different options for restructuring. After completing a study in 1995 and visiting 
the Mondragon cooperatives in Spain, the board of the Conseil recommended a move to a Mondragon-style 
corporate structure with one board overlooking and administering all of the cooperatives. The member 
cooperatives rejected this proposal. Subsequently, the organization chose to reorganize as a more provincially 
mandated organization with more secure funding, as represented by the move to the CDC and the partnership 
with RDÉE. 
 
Over the past few decades, the CDC has helped build a strong cooperative framework in the region.  
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Business model and financial independence 
The Canadian Cooperative Council and its cooperative memberships fund the CDC. Operational funding from 
the Canadian Cooperative Council suggests that this organization is not financially independent and therefore 
does not fit well with the EMES approach to social enterprise. However, the debate regarding moving to a 
Mondragon-style cooperative corporation in the 1990s suggests there was potential for the Evangeline 
Cooperatives to organize themselves collectively as a social enterprise at that stage.  
 
Participatory governance 
The CDC has a board of directors that represent the member cooperatives. Currently the CDC has one of 13 
seats on the board of directors of the RDÉE.  
 
Political economic position 
The CDC fits into the alternative wealth creation category. 
 
 
Case: St. Anthony Basin Resources Incorporated (SABRI) 
St Anthony, Newfoundland and Labrador 
 
Typology 
Legal structure: Non-shareholding corporation 
Ownership: Non-shareholding corporation, community property 
Purpose: Resource management for community purpose 
 
History 
St. Anthony Basin Resources Incorporated (SABRI) (St. Anthony Basin Resources Incorporated, 2015) was 
established in the Great Northern Peninsula region of Newfoundland and Labrador. The region has a population 
of approximately 4,500 people. Like many rural communities in Newfoundland and Labrador, St. Anthony and 
the Great Northern Peninsula region were economically devastated by the cod moratorium in 1992. To 
compensate for the loss of the cod fishery, many fishers moved into alternative fisheries such as shrimp and 
crab. In 1997, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans drastically increased the allowable catch of shrimp. 
While most of the new quota was allocated to private interest (individual harvesters) a special allocation of 3,000 
tonnes of additional catch was given to the St. Anthony region of the Great Northern Peninsula. SABRI was 
organized as a nonprofit social enterprise in order to manage this special allocation for the benefit of the 
community as a whole. Its mission is to “administer a 3,000 metric tonne allocation of Northern Shrimp on behalf 
of the communities from Big Brook to Goose Cove, in a manner resulting in expansion of the region’s economic 
base and improved employment opportunities in harmony with a rural setting and lifestyle” (St. Anthony Basin 
Resources Incorporated, 2015). 
 
The special allocation was a means for the government to use quota as a mechanism for community economic 
development rather than simply sectorial (fisheries) development. SABRI initially leased out the rights to the 
community’s quota with a requirement that the catch be landed and processed in St. Anthony. In the longer 
term, SABRI sought international partners to manage the catch, eventually attracting a number of partners with 
the commitment to build an advanced processing plant in St. Anthony with $12 million in investments. 
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All surpluses generated by SABRI are invested back into the community through business expansion opportunities 
and social and community development. SABRI’s business expansion activities are in response to local and 
international market demand (White & Hall, 2013). For instance, SABRI is investing in a salt fish market due to 
demands in Iceland and Newfoundland and Labrador. In terms of community development, SABRI undertook an 
oral history project to capture stories of cultural and historical significance. Additionally, some of SABRI’s projects 
have aspects of both economic expansion and community development. For instance, it started a muscle farming 
initiative that was intended to be a new economic opportunity, but tight competition has meant the project operates 
at a loss. SABRI, however, continues to run the venture because of the local employment it generates and the 
positive impact it has in supplying the local tourism sector (White & Hall, 2013). 
 
SABRI is an example where the EMES definition of social enterprise does not completely fit. In particular, SABRI’s 
development comes from a top-down approach where the federal government created the space for SABRI by 
allowing the special allocation of quota. It is not an organization that was formed by a group of citizens; rather it 
was formed as a response to, and under the direction of, government policy. Here we see one of the productive 
roles of government in creating and supporting place-based social enterprise. 
 
Business model and financial independence 
SABRI’s primary activity is the management of fishing quota based on the market. The royalties and revenues it 
earns form its fishing activities are re-invested back into the purpose of the organization. SABRI is financially 
independent. 
 
Participatory governance 
A volunteer board of directors made up of representatives of different organizations and stakeholders in the 
region governs SABRI. Representation on the board comes from fishers, plant workers, local community 
development agencies, and members of the local community.  
 
Political economic position 
SABRI fits into the alternative wealth creation category. 
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INSTITUTIONS 
Table 1 outlines some of the key pieces of legislation, policy, and associations present in the Atlantic Provinces 
that impact social enterprise 
 
       Table 1  - Key Institutions for Atlantic Canada Social Enterprise 
 
Key legislation and policy Associational presence 
 
Nova Scotia 
 
Co-operative Associations Act 
Companies Act 
Societies Act 
Community Economic Development Funds 
Community Interest Companies 
Social Impact Bonds 
Nova Scotia Co-operative Council  
Conseil coopérative acadien de la Nouvelle-Écosse 
Community Sector Council of Nova Scotia 
Nova Scotia Social Enterprise Working Group 
 
 
New Brunswick 
 
Co-operative Associations Act of New Brunswick 
Companies Act (New Brunswick) 
Community Nonprofit Organizations Secretariat 
 
Co-operative Enterprise Council of New Brunswick 
Conseil acadien de la coopération (Nouveau-Brunswick) 
 
Prince Edward Island 
 
Charities Act 
Companies Act 
Co-operative Associations Act 
Community Development Equity Tax Credit Act/Community 
Economic Development Business Program 
Conseil de développement coopératif de l’Île-du-Prince-
Édouard  
Prince Edward Island Co-operative Council 
 
 
Newfoundland and Labrador 
 
Co-operatives Act 
Corporations Act  
Trustee Act 
Community Sector Council of Newfoundland and 
Labrador 
Newfoundland and Labrador Federation of Co-operatives  
 
 
Key legislation, policy, and government supports 
Like other provinces across Canada, the Atlantic Provinces each have a similar set of legislation that frames the 
local context for social enterprise. In each province, organizations can form under three specific legal structures: 
incorporated companies, cooperatives, and nonprofit societies. In addition to these common structures, some 
provinces have unique forms of legislation and policy that impact social enterprise. Below, I explore both the 
common legal frameworks and the more unique policies that exist. 
 
Companies Act 
The companies/corporations acts of Atlantic Provinces allow for the creation of conventional share-ownership 
corporations. While social enterprise can take advantage of this aspect of incorporation, many organizations use 
a nonprofit form of corporation for the social economy. In Nova Scotia, nonprofit corporations are found in the 
portion of the Companies Act called a company limited by guarantee. Companies limited by guarantee are 
formed by members whose liability is limited to a specified amount (usually fairly nominal), which is to be used 
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to cover the debts of the organization upon winding up of the company. Companies limited by guarantee may or 
may not have shares. Companies limited by guarantee must include a set of articles of incorporation with their 
registration. It is within these articles that companies limited by guarantee can often institutionalize their social 
purpose. The companies (corporations) acts of the other Atlantic Provinces similarly allow for nonprofit 
corporations. In Newfoundland and Labrador, nonprofit corporations use articles of association to establish 
themselves within the Corporations Act. In PEI and New Brunswick, nonprofit corporations are incorporated via 
letters patent. 
 
Co-operatives Act 
The provincial cooperatives acts in Atlantic Canada provide a legal framework for organizations that are owned 
by and provide service to their members. Democratic equality of members and proportional distribution of 
surplus are enshrined within the act. In Nova Scotia, organizations can be limited by shares or, similar to a 
company limited by guarantee, limited by membership. A cooperative limited by membership is commonly called 
a nonprofit cooperative. Nonprofit cooperatives are typically more limited in accessing financial capital, as they 
cannot raise capital through selling shares to members. The cooperative acts of the other Atlantic Provinces are 
similar to that of Nova Scotia. 
 
Societies Act 
The Societies Act or Charities Act is used to incorporate an organization that has a benevolent or social 
purpose, but is barred from engaging in trade and business. Societies are barred from having any share capital 
and issuing dividends to members. The societies/nonprofit/charities acts of the other Atlantic Provinces are 
broadly similar. 
 
Beyond this common set of legal forms, there are three relatively novel policy supports for social enterprise in 
Atlantic Canada. Nova Scotia, however, is a leader in supportive social enterprise policy.  
 
First, in 1998, the Nova Scotia government, building on its successful equity tax credit program, established the 
Community Economic Development Investment Fund (CEDIF) program. The equity tax program offered a 30 
percent tax credit to investors who invested in Nova Scotia businesses. The CEDIF policy built on the tax credit 
(now 35 percent) by pre-approving CEDIF holdings as RRSP eligible and allowing CEDIF firms to solicit 
investments publicly. Furthermore, a community could establish a CEDIF to raise funds to invest in other 
businesses. For the investor, CEDIFs offered an attractive incentive to invest locally. A CEDIF investment 
receives a 35 percent provincial tax credit and must be held for five years. A further 20 percent tax credit is 
available if investors roll their investment over for a subsequent five-year period and another ten percent credit 
is available for a third five-year period. RRSP eligibility also provides an incentive to the investor. Finally, while 
most CEDIFs do not expect that value of shares to rise, some pay a dividend. The New Dawn CEDIFs (New 
Dawn manages three related CEDIF funds, which are profiled below) for instance, has paid out dividends 
ranging from 3 percent to 4.3 percent over the past ten years. While the CEDIF program was not specifically 
designed with social enterprise in mind, it has become a common tool for raising finances for many share-
holding social enterprises in Nova Scotia.  
 
The Government of PEI has replicated the Nova Scotia CEDIF program through the Community Development 
Equity Tax Credit Act, which it administers under its Community Economic Development Business (CEDB) 
program. Its objective is to “facilitate local investment in Prince Edward Island businesses, with the ultimate aim 
of stimulating rural community development” (PEI, 2014). PEI, however, places different restrictions on eligible 
CEDB investments. For instance, in PEI, the program limits investment into small businesses with caps on 
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financial resources (maximum $25 million in assets or revenues) and employment size (maximum 100 full-time 
employees).  
 
Second, Nova Scotia recently introduced Community Interest Companies (CIC). Legislation was passed in 2012 
though final regulations have yet to be introduced. CICs are companies that serve a community purpose, 
meaning they create benefits for society at large or a segment of society beyond those persons directly related 
to the company. Community purpose can include providing health, social, environmental, cultural, and 
educational services but excludes political purposes. The assets of a CIC are considered “locked” into the 
community they serve; they cannot be sold off upon dissolution but must be transferred to another community 
purpose entity (such as a charity or other CIC). Where a CIC has shares, there are limits to how much dividends 
can be paid to shareholders. In order to maintain their CIC status, a company must produce a community 
interest report each year demonstrating its adherence to the community purpose set out in its memorandum of 
association. There is no tax advantage to incorporating as a CIC. CICs will be seen as an alternative to 
charities, as they can raise equity financing and have more flexibility than charities in pursuing their social 
purpose.  
 
Third, in 2013, Nova Scotia announced that it would be the first Canadian jurisdiction to produce a Social Impact 
Bond (SIB). SIBs are incentives provided to the private sector or the social economy to address social issues. 
The private organization must front the costs of the intervention (building homes for homeless people, for 
instance), and when they have demonstrated success in addressing the issue, the government repays the 
investment plus a prescribed surplus. SIBs are somewhat controversial as they are often seen as further 
downloading of government provision and the privatization of social care (Joy & Shields, 2013). However, some 
social enterprises will likely see SIBs as another unique financing tool. As with CICs, Nova Scotia has not yet 
set out the regulations for SIBs. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Social enterprise in Atlantic Canada is an emerging phenomenon that makes use of a variety of approaches, is 
rooted to a legacy of community development, and is set in a context of a chronically weak economy. Social 
enterprise in Atlantic Canada tends to focus on wealth redistribution (in the case of the SJCLF) or wealth 
creation (New Dawn, SABRI, and the Evangeline Cooperatives). Atlantic social enterprise draws on distinct 
histories and forms, including cooperatives, nonprofits, and community business. A common theme in Atlantic 
social enterprise is addressing chronic social-economic issues, such as poverty and unemployment, in particular 
communities.  
 
From a political economy perspective, the cooperatives of the Antigonish Movement and the community 
businesses rooted in that history were established with radical, transformative ideals. However, in practice, most 
have evolved into alternative, principle-based, wealth creating enterprise rather than transformational 
enterprises. While economic depletion can open the potential for radically alternative economic approaches, in 
practice, the enterprises have to exist in the harsh context of a chronically weak market economy. These 
historical roots in a radical alternative contrast with a practice of alternative wealth creation and institutional 
(government) approaches to social enterprise that are based on redistribution.  
 
Historically the examples of social enterprise have existed under different terminologies (cooperatives, 
nonprofits, community business, etc.). This raises the question of what the language of social enterprise adds to 
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these pre-existing forms. For whom does social enterprise, as a concept, work? A redistributionist approach to 
social enterprise works well for cash-strapped governments looking to sell the downloading of social services to 
communities. However, there are alternative approaches. 
 
If it is to be an effective practice for change, the term needs to wrestle with its political dimensions where the 
social purpose falls in the public sphere (see Hillenkamp & Laville, 2014). Re-engaging with the political aspect 
of social enterprise, in the Atlantic Canada context, raises the possibility of reviving the roots of the Antigonish 
Movement, which are linked to a vision of fundamental and transformational change for a region that has, more 
often than not, suffered from the impacts of global capitalism. 
 
Social enterprise, conceptually and in practice, continues to gain ground in the Atlantic Region. New policies in 
support of social enterprise have been established in Nova Scotia. However, we have yet to see what fruit those 
policies may bear and what direction social enterprise may take. 
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